Our current operational doctrines display a serious blind spot with regard to the issue of conflict termination. How should the operational commander translate the political or military objectives of a conflict into war termination conditions to be achieved as the product of a campaign? This essay argues that war termination deserves equal billing with other aspects of the campaign planning process and should be guided by a set of principles or guidelines which, like other dimensions of that process, are best considered earlier rather than later. Based on a review of existing theory, doctrine, and recent historical illustrations, it suggests three requirements which war termination doctrine must address: operational doctrine should tell us something about how to define military conditions in a manner that relates those conditions to strategic aims; it should facilitate a military contribution to the bargaining process inherent in the terminal phase of war; and it should help to guide the transition from hostilities back toward a state of peace. 1 nation concepts to be anathema. Likewise, those of a more liberal persuasion have found war termination studies, especially those related to strategic nuclear warfare, distasteful since they feared that "thinking about the unthinkable" might in fact make the unthinkable more likely.
ABSTRACT
Above all, American strategic thinking has for good reason given preference to concepts of deterrence while our operational thinking has focused more on concepts of warfighting that would allow us to "win" without resort to nuclear escalation. Recent events, however, suggest that discussion of war termination should perhaps be assigned a higher priority in our thinking about strategic and operational matters. This is not an essay about the recent Gulf War against Iraq, but growing dissatisfaction with the apparent outcome of that war suggests a need for more refined thinking about how we end our involvement in wars. 2 Nor do we need to refer to the Gulf War to find instances where Americans were dissatisfied with the end state resulting from a particular war; in fact, discussion about how we should (have) end(ed) a given war historically has tended to be a more prominent feature of post-war, vice pre-war, debates among Americans.
Moreover, as our national military strategy evolves away from a fixation on global war with the Soviets toward a focus 2 For an early critique espousing the "tragic conclusion" that the U.S. failed to win a "decisive victory" in the Gulf War, see U.S. 
Bounding the Problem
Efforts to apply war termination principles to the campaign planning process should begin by drawing certain preliminary boundaries around our discussion. It must be recognized at the outset that the subject can be approached from different points along the spectrum of conflict, from strategic nuclear warfare to low-intensity conflict, and the level at which one focuses the discussion almost certainly influences the conclusions to be drawn. What may be required to "end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interest and its allies" clearly varies as one moves along the conflict spectrum.4 Since our current military strategy emphasizes adaptive planning focused largely, though not exclusively, on "major" and "lesser" regional contingencies, which presumably would fall within the band of mid-intensity conflict on our spectrum, it seems appropriate that Similarly, OVERLORD's predecessor, Operation TORCH in 1942, aimed at expelling the Axis powers from French North Africa and offered no pretense that its success would end the war. Rather, as an enabling campaign, it served the strategic aim of engaging forces Axis early on while allowing time to marshal the manpower and material required to mount OVERLORD. Given this distinction, we note that our discussion here is limited to terminal campaigns (which, given a military strategy focused more on regional conflicts, are likely to be the more common pattern).
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Reference to the operational level of war identifies the level at which campaign planning generally occurs. As the link between the strategic and tactical levels of war, "operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals . through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations." Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1986), p. 10.
The concept of war termination itself requires some elucidation. Clearly, war termination implies something more than merely ending hostilities, for if that were the only criterion, then a simple decision to stop fighting would suffice.
Rather, war termination is more appropriately viewed as a process, an interaction among the belligerents involving tradeoffs, during which each side strives to attain its policy objectives within the limits of acceptable costs. "Victory," if defined as attaining the full measure of one's objectives, has little meaning without reference to the investment made to achieve those objectives.
If war termination, then, is properly viewed as a process,
what marks the beginning and end point of that process? With the understanding that these points are not likely to be clearly defined in practice, it seems conceptually convenient to mark the beginning of the war termination process as that "point at which an informed, objectie outside observer could predict the outcome of the war." 6 That is, it represents the point at which one side seems clearly destined to achieve its policy objectives at the expense of its adversary. A terminus for the war termination process is more readily identified: the cessation of hostilities, whether through exhaustion, capitulation, or negotiation of a cease fire. Hammerman notes the coincidence between this concept and Clausewitz's "point of irreversibility:" the moment at which a commander's reserves become inferior to those of his adversary.
Our concern here, then, is the process of war termination as it relates to campaign planning. A focus on planning implies some level of premeditation which, in turn, is necessarily rooted in the premise that our planning activities are rationally based.
Activities related to exiting a war, especially one that is going badly, may not always be rationally based; anger, a desire for revenge, concerns with prestige, etc., may enter into the calculus. 7 Logic, however, requires that our argument for inclusion of endgame considerations into the campaign planning process be based upon an assumption of rational behavior.
A Military Role?
It is not self-evident that the business (or, more exactly, the politics) of ending a war is one which properly admits the military commander. Paralleling a Western tendency to see a clear division between war and peace, many observers tend also to see an equally sharp demarcation between political and "purely . Although yet to be formally promulgated, it is anticipated that ALO will deal more explicitly with issues related to conflict termination.
conditions we must realize in order to reach that destination, those necessary conditions which we expect by their existence will provide us our established aim . . . From the envisioned end state we can develop the operational objectives which, taken in combination, will achieve those conditions. 1 7
As with the Army's operational doctrine, Marine Corps doctrine does little more than cite the necessity to determine a "desired end state" that is somehow related to larger strategic purposes. In contrast to their treatment of, for example, logistical, deployment, or organizational concepts, neither joint nor service doctrines currently suggest principles according to which war termination concepts should be integrated into the campaign planning process. To ensure that our operational planning effectively serves the requirements of our national military strategy, this doctrinal gap is one we can ill-afford not to fill in.
Expanding the Doctrinal Frontier
A concern for war termination suggests three fundamental requirements that our joint and separate service operational doctrines must address. First, conflict termination doctrine must assist planners in defining military conditions and relating those conditions to strategic aims; second, it must contribute to the tacit bargaining process inherent in the terminal phases of a war; and finally, it must offer guidance on how best to transition from active hostilities back toward a state of peace. For those who have considered the issue of conflict termination at the strategic level, the Korean War has often provided a common basis for discussion of problems inherent in the process. And at the operational level as well, the Korean case brings to light many of these requirements for war termination doctrine.
War Termination in the Korean Case
According to the definition adopted earlier, the Korean War had clearly entered its terminal phase by June 1951. By that date, an informed, objective outside observer could certainly have predicted the general outline of the eventual outcome.
MacArthur's brilliant stroke at Inchon in September 1950 had
given United Nations forces the upper hand and had prompted an upward revision in U.S. war aims from restoration of the status quo ante bellum along the 38th parallel toward reunification of '--entire peninsula under S:,ut---re--.
---I.
Pursuit of this expanded objective triggered massive Chinese intervention in
November, prompting MacArthur's laconic comment that, "We face an entirely new war."
By March 1951, however, the Chinese offensive had effectively been blunted, and an objective observer could certainly have concluded that the Chinese and North Koreans, having thrown their best punch, had been denied the opportunity to achieve their maximum political objective of unification of the peninsula under communist rule. As the United Nations pursued its Spring offensive, the Eighth Army Commander, General James Van Fleet would later comment that " . . in June 1951 we had the Chinese whipped. They were definitely gone. They were in awful shape. During the last week in May we captured more than 10,000 prisoners. '' 19 Likewise, while the United States had not necessarily been denied its maximum objective, the evident costs of pursuing Restoration of the 38th parallel accompanied by an armistice at an early date became the principal American objective.
Throughout the twenty-four month stalemate that followed, The reason for continuing the extraordinarily successful enterprise that the U.N. offensive had become had nothing to do with the acquisition of more real estate. Its purpose should have been to continue maximum pressure on the disintegrating Chinese armies as a means of getting them not only to request but actually to conclude an armistice.
The line they finally settled for two years later, or something like that line, might have been achieved in far less time if we had meanwhile continued the pressure that was disintegrating their armies. 20 20 Brodie, War and Politics, p. 94 This may at times require planners to define operational objectives which exceed bottomline politcal objectives in order to gain leverage to assist in the expeditious termination of hostilities and the effective transition to a post-hostilities regime.
Some Guidelines for Campaign Planners
Our argument throughout has been that the current gap in our operational doctrines regarding conflict termination seriously hampers our ability to plan effective military campaigns.
Working from commonly accepted war termination precepts at the strategic level and armed with an appreciation of war termination issues in recent conflicts, we propose some tentative first steps toward an appropriate doctrine in this arena. P Consider identifying a distinct war termination phase in the campaign planning process.
Simply stated, war termination is too fundamental an issue to be subordinated as a lesser included component of some other aspect of the campaign planning process. 
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Viewed independently, none of these proposed guidelines appears startling; some will even suggest, quite correctly, that these prescriptions are, like so many other aspects of warfighting doctrine, more exemplary of common sense than of any particular revealed wisdom. What is startlin&, however, is the obvious absence of any coherent approach for conflict termination in any of our current warfightin? doitrines.
Concluding Observations
We have repLcltedly made the point here that the war termination component of a campaign plan represents a transitional phase: a transitirn from war to peace; a transition from a military-dominant role toward a civilian-dominant role; a trarsition from a set of circumstances and problems generally familiar to operational planners toward others with which they may be decidedly less so. These points reinforce the importance of a high level of dialogue and coordination between civilian and military decision-makers regarding the conflict termination process. As Fred Ikl& notes, "In preparing a major military operation, military leaders and civilian officials can effectively work together . . . to create a well-meshed integrated plan. ' " 2 2 The ability of military leaders to contribute to that joint planning process will in part depend upon the extent to which they have carefully considered the challenges posed by the war termination problem in the period before deterrence fails. 
